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Hide, Hiding, Hidden: Narrative as Concealment and Revelation
R.A. Goodrich – Deakin University
What we hide and what is hidden from us is concealed, secreted from view. Like the hide of an animal, it both
masks and protects our interior from the intrusion of all that is exterior to it. To hide oneself or an object or even
to hide thoughts or feelings; to be hidden from apprehension (in both its meanings); and to be hiding or in hiding
—all alternate between a state of affairs and a process. "Hidden stories" conjure all these senses, be they stories
about the hidden or stories that are hidden or what is hidden in the act of story-telling. Before engaging in the
"hidden stories" explored by the contributors to this Issue of Double Dialogues, we shall explore what is hidden
in the act of story-telling, or, more formally expressed, the concealed and the revealed dimensions of narrative
viewed in experiential terms.
I
Let us begin with a commonplace of experience. Both the act of writing and the act of reading, whether framed
in experiential terms more broadly or in cognitive terms more narrowly, are deeply entwined in the process of
revealing that which seems to have been concealed previously. The revelatory powers, if not the purpose,
attributed to the arts have been variously connected to debates over the relationship between the arts and truth,
the arts and morality, the arts and reality, even the arts and spirituality. In what follows, however, let us keep our
focus upon those acts of writing and reading out of which our conscious encounters with narrative emerge.
When reflecting upon a series of his stories written between 1974 and 1978, John Berger found that, although
writing for him had "no territory of its own," the very act of writing was "nothing except the act of approaching
the experience written about" (1979: 6). Similarly, "the act of reading the written text" for him was "a
comparable act of approach" (1979:6). But how do we approach experience? Berger responds as follows:
experience folds in upon itself, refers backwards and forwards to itself through the referents of hope
and fear; and, by the use of metaphor...it is continually comparing like with unlike, what is small
with what is large, what is near with what is distant. And so the act of approaching a given moment
of experience involves both scrutiny (closeness) and the capacity to connect (distance). The
movement of writing resembles that of a shuttle on a loom: repeatedly it approaches and withdraws,
closes in and takes its distance. Unlike a shuttle, however, it is not fixed to a static frame (1979: 6).
Berger's foray stops short of exploring the nature of story-telling as distinct from that of the story-teller and
village gossip. Perhaps instinctively he realises how far removed we remain from being able to articulate with
any certainty the necessary and sufficient criteria of narrative, of what all narratives and only narratives have in
common. Consider, for instance, the seven year-old Alyssa here. She may well have the capacity to recognise
and talk about water without any knowledge whatsoever of its defining molecular structure. Conversely, Alyssa
may well understand that people are considered bald even if they partly lack hair upon their scalps and yet not
know, in the particular case of her wigless nonna, whether or not she is bald. So it is in the case of narrative. And
even if we could define narrative, that still may tell us nothing about its significance for us, let alone about why
we are so captive to what narratives reveal and conceal.
Of course, it may be counter-argued that the notion of narrative is an open-ended one for no other reason than
new examples are continually being added to the store of narratives. Therefore, what act of writing qualifies as a
narrative is more appropriately construed in terms of what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1945) dubbed "family
resemblances" in which "we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing" (§66);
indeed, we "extend our concept" (of narrative in this case)
as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread resides not in the fact
that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres (§67).
Yet, as the young Alyssa is introduced to new examples of foods, then the category of her meals keeps
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expanding. However, we would be mistaken to think that the defining characteristics of what comprises a meal
have changed as distinct from the instances falling within the category of meals. Nor, to return to the analogy of
fibre, whilst it may be true that we cannot locate any one characteristic or property common to all narratives,
need it follow that narrative cannot be defined?
Perhaps defining features are not immediately observable within narratives themselves, something those such as
Jerome Bruner (1991) and David Herman (2009), who have proposed a multiplicity of key textual
characteristics, have nonetheless found. Perhaps they are hidden because the features in question have less to do
with narrative objects and more to do with narrative activities. And those activities, in turn, can be equally
related to those doing the narrating and those responding to it. From this perspective of activities, narratives can
be defined by their relational properties, explicable in terms of either the functions or purposes they serve or the
procedures or practices by which they gain communal recognition. Amongst the purposes narrative serves in the
visual, performing, and literary arts is the ordering of experience both temporally and evaluatively. It may well
be that narratives, when embedded within, say, educational, legal, or religious institutions, serve didactic, social,
or ritual purposes independently of their artistic merit or intentions. Nevertheless, narratives so contextualised
appear to replicate narratives in the artistic realm. They represent, express, or re-enact experience and they are
experientially received by viewers, listeners, and readers. Even the most blatantly fictionalised of narrated
experiences is experienced by its recipients albeit in a mediated, if not an hypothetical or second-order, manner.
Seven year-old Alyssa may herself have never encountered an aardvark grieving for its young, let alone any
other creature or person in that situation. Yet that need not preclude her, prompted through conversations with
her nonna, from imaginatively re-experiencing the grief related. Moreover, to pursue this example, there is
always the possibility that, at least initially, the narrative may have implicitly failed to fulfil its subsequently
understood function for Alyssa in the role of reader. Historically speaking, that fate potentially awaits all
narratives as readerships wax and wane.
Nothing we have said so far should suggest that narrative and experience should be equated; rather, we have
been exploring something of the complex relationship between them in terms of activities that authors and
audiences engage. But before explicating more fully our passing comment about the ordering of experience in
temporal and evaluative ways—perhaps at the kernel of what might be ultimately understood to be hidden in and
by stories—let us pursue the appeal to narrative activities, for these, too, can be unexpectedly concealed.
Consider our seven year-old Alyssa once more. What must she do for us to describe her as, say, reading a
narrative? Whilst her personality, gender, ethnicity, class, and age might prove interesting sociologically, such
factors do not illuminate her actual role here. Whilst gauging her psychological state—what is she thinking?
what is she feeling?—before, during, and after the narrative act might satisfy our curiosity, it again does not
analyse her actual role. So, would observing her flicking pages one after the other or dragging her cursor down
an electronic screen be an act of reading a narrative? Or would we be more assured if she were sub-vocalising,
mouthing various words or phrases as her eyes scanned across the page or screen? If she happened to be looking
at a reproduction of stone fissures indistinguishable from utterances inscribed in a cursive script, is she reading?
What makes such questions peculiar is that we have slipped into assuming that brute actions are one and the
same as participating in an activity, in a practice, in which various actions comprise components of following a
set of constitutive rules. In other words, these and other specifiable actions are, as John Rawls (1955: 25) and
John Searle (1969: 51-52) amongst others have long argued, what "count as" reading in particular contexts
because, as the former expresses it,
In the case of actions specified by practices it is logically impossible to perform them outside the
stage setting provided by those practices, for unless there is the practice, and unless the requisite
proprieties are fulfilled, whatever one does, whatever movements one makes, will fail to count as a
form of action which the practice specifies (1955: 25).
If the activity of reading narratives can be legitimately cast in terms of a practice, then that clarifies why it is that
Alyssa learnt to read, not by the inculcation of a set of rules, but by her continuing engagement with the practice.
There were no rules for reading, to adopt the stance first promulgated by James Ross (1974), other than those that
may have been relevant for developing subsets of linguistic skills—the morpho-phonological and the syntactic—
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by which she could negotiate between oral and written media. Indeed, there were no rules for narrative other than
those that may have been relevant for developing the meta-language—plot and characters, conflicts and
situations, climax and resolution—by which she could begin to analyse individual narratives as objects.
Let us end this brief enquiry into the relationship between narrative and experience by returning to their temporal
and evaluative facets. If William Labov has been instrumental in drawing our attention to the way temporality is
manifested not only in the origin of verbal narratives but also in the very clausal sequences of their utterances, he
has also identified the primacy of their evaluative nature that rationalises the telling of the tale in the first place.
As Labov succinctly states, there is "a more basic consideration" than, for instance, arguing whether narrative
utterances portray experiences truthfully or not or in causal sequence or not (2006: 37). The principal issue is that
"a narrative is about something" which in practice entails "that it is judged to be reportable" (2006: 37-38).
Narrative activities, in other words, must also have a point or significance that goes beyond merely reporting a
state of affairs ("Nonna is nervous") or the location of an agent or entity ("Nonna is home"). When previously
mentioning Alyssa's initial difficulty with the story of the grieving aardvark, we cast this in terms of her inability
at first to anchor it to her experience. Its point or significance remained hidden until her nonna intervened.
Perhaps, it is not accidental that Alyssa, on reaching the point at which we read narratives so often concealed in
solitude and silence, has entered the practice of reading their significance revealed through solidarity and
conversation.
II
Collectively, the many contributors to "Hidden Stories: Interior Worlds" range across visual, performing, and
literary arts and artists. However, the second part of this paper wishes to avoid becoming a patchwork of précis.
Instead, its purpose is to present the kinds of questions raised by contributors and, at the same time, depict
something of the challenging conceptual terrain in which their notions of hidden stories nestle. Starting with the
visual arts, whereas Deborah Walker asks what is it that Giorgio de Chirico wanted to hide about the sources of
his early Turin streetscapes, Rob Haysom and Les Morgan question why the Antipodean and British modernist
painters, Arnold Shore and David Bomberg respectively, remained hidden from critical acclaim. Here, we are
confronted by a contrast between a psychological and a sociological approach respectively. It is a contrast that
assigns agency to artist and audience respectively whilst simultaneously construing the process of hiding as an
intentional act: both a deliberate act and an act directed at some goal or object. On the one hand, Walker queries
why an artist would want to hide the actual perceptual sources and experience occasioning his or her work and
what that might imply about the creative process. More specifically, she asks whether the fragmented,
imaginative depiction of Turin—towers, statues, arcades—can be seen as de Chirico's attempt to render
metaphysical themes from Nietzsche on canvas. On the other hand, Haysom pursues the notion of audience less
as individuals and more as art institutions, especially in the form of public galleries. Readers are asked to
consider if institutions are prey to the stipulations of benefactors and manipulations of the art market as much as
they are to spatial constraints and curatorial prejudices, not to say to the promotion of the arts as part of the
entertainment industry. Morgan similarly plots the ways in which the antipathetic attitudes of intellectuals,
critics, and artists can be shaped by the socio-political institutions of the day to the point of hiding the
substantial contribution of a working class Jew.
Principally focusing upon cinema are Stephen Goddard on what lies hidden behind the facades in Cat People
[1942], Leon Marvell on what can be brought out of hiding by the application of an iconographical analysis of
Hellraiser [1987], and George Raitt on how a pre-occupation with fidelity to the literary precursors of such
screen adaptations as Onegin [1999], The Monkey's Mask [2002], and Brokeback Mountain [2005] actually hides
the wealth of inter-textual connexions and interpretations brought to bear by the reader-viewer. To a greater or
lesser extent and despite their superficial differences, have Goddard, Marvell, and Raitt, not unlike Walker,
Haysom, and Morgan implicitly construed the act of interpreting ("reading") the visual arts from a particular
communicative point of view? To elaborate briefly, have these contributors in practice assumed that the
disclosures of any act of interpretation ultimately derive from one or more of the six interlocking factors Roman
Jakobson (1960: 66-73) so influentially identified as necessary and sufficient conditions of any act of
communication, artistic and ordinary? Readers of this Issue of Double Dialogues may find it instructive to track
the degree to which, for instance, Haysom initially frames his hidden story by mainly focusing upon the context,
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Walker upon the artist, Goddard upon the code, and Raitt upon the viewer-reader before accommodating other
factors.
Turning our attention to two contributors who themselves overtly move between the visual and the verbal media
in tracing the work of two renegade women, Ivar Kvistad on the activist Valerie Solanas and Pavlina Radia on
the writer and illustrator Djuna Barnes, Whilst Kvistad ultimately re-constructs something of the cultural
revolution emanating from New York of the 'sixties in Solanas' disturbed, provocative, at times crass 1968
manifesto adopted by the feminist movement, he also forefronts the way in which attacking iconic artworks or
artists—stealing or smashing the former; kidnapping or killing the latter—shapes the historical narratives of the
arts long after actual knowledge of the perpetrators becomes a story of the hidden, the forgotten, or the
dismissed. We need only recall when, in August 1911, La Giaconda was stolen from the Musée du Louvre in
Paris, the poet Guillaume Apollinaire and the painter Pablo Picasso were immediately arraigned. Since then, it
has arguably been acclaimed as "the world's most famous painting" (Riding, 2005), parodied by the avant-garde,
including Marcel Duchamp, L.H.O.O.Q.[1919] and Solanas' intended victim, Andy Warhol, Thirty are Better
than One [1963]. Yet who amongst us can recite the story of the thief, Vincenzo Peruggia, and his appeal to
patriotism when apprehended in December 1913? Radia has a different target: namely, that the process of story-
telling transforms the story-teller into what she calls "a renegade absence." Beneath her critical exploration of
recent cultural theorists and the multi-media work of Barnes, readers may well ponder, is she ultimately teasing
out themes traceable to Aristoteles' attempt to distinguish the ontological character of the arts in the Ethika
Nikomakheia? The passage from Book Six, Chapter Four repays our special attention:
All Art deals with bringing something into existence; and to pursue an art means to study how to
bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not, and the efficient cause of which lies in the
maker and not in the thing made; for Art does not deal with things that exist or come into existence
of necessity, or according to nature, since these have their efficient cause in themselves. But as
doing and making are distinct, it follows that Art, being concerned with making, is not concerned
with doing (1140a10ff., tr. Harris Rackham).
At not too distant a remove from the 'renegade" concerns of Kvistad and Radia is Michelle Aung Thin. As an
Anglo-Burmese writer, she attempts to disclose the degree to which authenticity can only be captured within
narratives of colonial, marginalised individuals licensed by the ethnicity of the writer. Were that the case, we are
invited to consider the implications for the historical and ideological contexts in which such literature is read.
And, as an accompanying question of "for whom are narratives of alterity written?" Aung Thin also asks us
whether such literature can act as a "site of transgression" which, by recreating the hidden boundaries of alien
subjectivities, undermines such contexts.
The next group of contributors—Patrick West, Neena Balwan Sachdev, and Ewen Jarvis—exemplify the ways in
which quite specific theorists can be deployed as a means of disclosure. Jarvis, for instance, explores the
experience of reading served by the structures of libraries as a place for acts of creative imagination largely by
way of Gaston Bachelard; Sachdev, the ethical significance to be attached to the erotic depiction of the young
male in two recent novels by Christos Tsiolkas, an ethical understanding informed by Emmanuel Lévinas; and
West, how the late fiction of Janet Frame does not so much demonstrate as contribute towards the literary critical
theory of Gilles Deleuze. Some readers, especially if unfamiliar with the theorist being brought to a text, may be
inclined to dispute the lines of argument developed by these three contributors; they may feel that their respective
explications of works by Murakami, Tsiolkas, and Frame are contestable; they may even demand more delving
into the concepts and claims of the respective theories of Bachelard, Lévinas, and Deleuze. Yet even such
unknowing readers would still recognise in these literary critical essays that they have been introduced to new
inter-textual relationships. And by inter-textuality here we do not simply mean three creative writers sourced
cognitively and thematically to three intellectual writers. Do we not also allow for how the struggle to depict a
text's "intelligibility" or "meaning," as Jonathan Culler (1981: 103) once argued, delimits "its participation in the
discursive spaces of a culture," in the "signifying practices of a culture"?
Perhaps we should remind ourselves of what characterises the logic of confronting new disclosures by critical
analyses that appeal to the enlarged conception of inter-textuality deployed by the above-mentioned contributors,
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Are they not opening debate, as Gregory Bateson (1979: 142-143) once suggestively claimed, by its abductive
implications? So, for instance, one's belief that, by creating an imaginary narrative, a writer actually contributes
to the development of another's theory might on the face of it seem absurd. However, if the conjecture or
hypothesis that fictional stories engender artistic theories were true, then the previously mentioned belief would
be unexceptional and therefore gives some grounds for regarding the hypothesis as veracious or at least the best
explanation in the circumstances. (Of course, we should note, the hypothesis in question cannot be taken as
confirmed in the way that the hypothesis proposed by Albert Einstein about general relativity in 1905 was
confirmed during the solar eclipse of 1919.) Such abductive processes should not be dismissed as the sad lot of
the arts because they are bereft of deductive (or necessary) and inductive (or probable) inferences. Abductive
inferences are just as commonly used in the clinical and physical sciences when plausibly attempting to explain
the actual world as they are by readers and viewers grappling to comprehend fictional worlds to which they have
been exposed.
By contrast to West, Sachdev, and Jarvis, Hadeel Abdel-Hameed and Raya Al-Naqshabandy explicitly shun a
theoretical framing of their investigation into the one-act play, Finding the Sun [1983] by Edward Albee.
Resolutely returning to a recounting of the plot, the authors argue that what is revealed by so doing is a "double
mirroring" of existential themes and situations and metaphor. Plot, characters, setting—the staple diet of
everyday discourse about drama—are said to be the very means by which the human predicament is enacted
upon the stage by portraying stages of life and love in a piece given more to mood than to movement. Katherine
Lyall-Watson finds that playwrights have a licence to uncover the hidden lives of individuals not granted to
those narrating biographies or memoirs. Whilst finding that both kinds of writers are given to concealing and
revealing details, both are bound to truthfulness of a different kind. Is it the kind of difference John Hospers
(1946: 162ff.) once articulated as the respective difference between "truth to" our felt experience of events,
entities, and persons and "truth about" the actual facts of events, entities, and persons?
When delving into source material for a novel, Melisa Ashley encountered a dual act of concealment by Jacob
and Wilhelm Grimm. The Grimms not only revised the ancient folktale, "The Girl Without Hands," with its
taboo antagonist of an incestuous father, in their seventh 1857 edition of Kinder-und-Hausmärchen pitched at a
more explicitly bourgeois, Christian readership, but both then and in the first 1811 edition excised the role of and
variant relayed by their informant, Marie Hassenpflug. Svend Erik Larsen also brings out of hiding not merely
hidden aspects, to an Anglophone audience, of stories by Hans Christian Anderson, Edward Dekker, and Amitav
Ghosh. However, in so doing, Larsen also returns that audience to one of the more dominant intellectuals of the
XXth century entre guerre, Karl Bühler (1934: 42ff.), and his principle of abstractive relevance constitutive of
both ordinary and imaginative perception and recalled perception (or memory) by which actions and objects
assume the status of signs be they verbal or non-verbal. In other words, the principle of abstractive relevance acts
as a governing explanation for the process of perceiving—and ultimately conceiving—all experience in terms of
"selection" and "combination" of "distinctive features" (to echo the influential application of the principle
applied to auditory signs of speech by Roman Jakobson (1956: 97-99)). We are, to return to John Berger initially
quoted at the beginning of this paper, "continually comparing like with unlike, what is small with what is large,
what is near with what is distant" (1979: 6). That said, how does Larson apply Bühler's principle? Is he justified
in interpreting the principle to extend to a dialectical relationship between the different but related processes of
remembering and forgetting, showing and hiding in stories of experience? Does the principle, in turn, rationalise
why and how writer and reader, painter and viewer, both participate in the process of unravelling the hidden?
Finally, we arrive at the beginning of this memorial Issue of Double Dialogues: an essay by Teresa Cannon who
saw photojournalist Peter Davis' novel, Abraham's Pictures, to publication. One of the tasks she sets herself is to
argue that the text and photographs comprising the narrative and the author's pre-occupation with what lies
"outside the frame" of "the decisive moment" propelling the act of story-telling is not a hidden autobiography.
The other task, in light of meditations on photography by Roland Barthes (1980), is to return us to the
transformation of the act of experiencing a narrative where actual and narrated images enter the text. Or, to close
with the words of the protagonist in Davis (2009: 4):
'Taking pictures is easy,' Abraham had once said... 'It's looking at them that's difficult. Whatever it is
that returns our gaze, that's what we have to deal with.'
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We can no more follow a televised narrative by taking our television set apart than by taking a television camera
apart. Narratives are simply not reducible to the activity that produces them or to the instruments by which they
are made. As all contributors to this Issue have revealed, the content of narrative is not reducible to the raw
material by which it is conveyed. De Chirico's oil painting, La Torre Rossa [1913], is made on canvas, but it is
not an oil painting of canvas: that which is certainly not hidden is not what "returns our gaze."
April 2011
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